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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PAROLE EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE USED TO EXPAND 
INSURANCE COVERAGE. 
Mr. Youngblood, the injured plaintiff, argues that he has not "for the purpose of 
contract interpretation ever sought to inject parole evidence into this case." Youngblood 
Brief at 5. He also admits there is no ambiguity in the policy. Youngblood Brief at 7, 
n.3. See also Point II, below. However, the effect of his argument does inject parole 
evidence to create new contract terms unintended by the insurer, and contrary to the clear 
contract language. Mr. Youngblood argues that even though his company's insurance 
policy provided underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) for him as a motorist (See Auto 
Owner's Original Brief at 6-7), the policy should be expanded by use of parole evidence, 
to include him as a pedestrian. If parole evidence is used to inject new contract terms to 
expand coverage beyond that actually provided, the policy reasons behind restricting the 
use of parole evidence only to cases of ambiguity, and then only to explain or interpret 
the ambiguity, are violated. Oral statements after the fact by persons seeking money 
recoveries through more favorable, expansion of actual contract terms should not be 
allowed, with the limited exception where parole evidence could explain an ambiguity. 
And in insurance contracts, parole evidence is not even needed in the face of an 
ambiguity, because ambiguous language in an insurance policy will automatically be 
interpreted in favor of the insured and coverage. 
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Although Mr. Youngblood now asserts there is no ambiguity, he still attempts to 
employ parole evidence of vague statements by an independent sales agency's 
representative, to expand intended coverage to include coverage unintended by the 
insurer, which parole statements Mr. Youngblood personally felt were "lame" (Auto 
Owner's Original Brief at 4, para. 9), and which parole statements would allegedly create 
UIM coverage even when Mr. Youngblood is sitting at his desk (Auto Owner's Original 
Brief at 4, para. 10), or walking down the street (Id.). Such use of parole evidence would 
be violative of the parole evidence rule and principles underlying the rule. 
POINT II 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY AT ISSUE IS NOT ONLY 
ADMITTEDLY NOT AMBIGUOUS, BUT IS ALSO NOT DENSE 
AND REBARBATIVE, COMPLEX, OR CONFUSING AS MR. 
YOUNGBLOOD ALLEGES. 
Mr. Youngblood quotes extensively from the case of American Family Mut. Ins. 
Co.v. Jeffery, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12225 (S.D. Ind. 2000), apparently an unpublished 
opinion because no citation to the federal supplement digest (F. Supp.) is given. In that 
case, whether published or unpublished, the Court states that the policy there at issue was 
"dense, and rebarbative", and "complex." Youngblood's brief at 12. By contrast, Mr. 
Youngblood admits that the policy at issue is not ambiguous, but avers it is confusing: 
"although the policy language in question . . . is not, strictly speaking, ambiguous, it is . . 
. confusing." Youngblood's brief at pg. 7, n.3. Mr. Youngblood states that he "has never 
contended that the policy language at issue is ambiguous." Youngblood's brief at 5. 
Theoretically, perhaps, language could be complex and confusing, but not ambiguous. 
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However, the language in question is not dense, rebarbative, complex or confusing. See 
Auto Owner's original brief at 6-7 for the fairly simple clear language of the policy. 
Cases cited by Mr. Youngblood, which come to their conclusions because of the 
extremely complex, dense, and rebarbative language of other insurance policies not at 
consideration here, should not be relied upon in cases where policy language is clear, as 
in the case at bar. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD DISTINGUISH WHAT IS MEANT BY 
AN INSURANCE COMPANY AGENT, AND REMAND THIS 
CASE FOR TRIAL ONLY IF THIS COURT HOLDS THAT 
ALLEGED ORAL, PRE-PURCHASE REPRESENTATIONS OF 
AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTING COMPANY'S AGENT 
CAN BE USED TO EXPAND COVERAGE OF A WRITTEN 
POLICY ISSUED BY A SEPARATE INSURER. 
In accepting certiorari, this Court stated that the issue was, "whether equitable 
estoppel may apply . . . where the scope of coverage is misstated by a company aRent 
prior to the insured's purchase . . . " (emphasis added). In rendering its decision, this 
court should distinguish what is meant by "a company agent". Different consequences of 
the court's decision would be appropriate depending on what is meant by "a company 
agent". 
Plaintiff appears to blur any distinction which this Court might make between an 
agent in the sense of a paid or salaried officer, agent or employee of an insurer, and what 
might be inartfully considered an agent in the sense of an employee of independent 
contracting sales agency, which sells the insurer's insurance, as is the case at bar. Mr. 
Youngblood appears to "lump" all people into one group and assume that the Court must 
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make a decision with respect to all in that group. See, for example, Youngblood's brief 
at Statement of Case, para. 8 ("Mr. Youngblood relied . . . in purchasing the subject 
policy . . . on representations of Auto Owner's agents . . ."); para. 10 ("Mr. Youngblood, 
in reliance on the said representations of Auto Owners' agents, did not. . ."); para. 11 (". 
. . Auto Owner's should, by virtue of its agent's statements . . ."); Argument, pg. 7 (". . . 
Mr. Youngblood's reliance on the agent's pre-policy purchase representations . . ."); pg. 7 
(". . . [such as the instant statements by the Auto Owner's agent] . . ."); pg. 8 (". . . that 
Auto Owner's agent made specific pre-policy purchase representations . . ."); pg. 8 ("Mr. 
Youngblood . . . in his reliance on what his insurance company representative told him."); 
pg. 14 ("It . . . for a jury to determine whether Mr. Youngblood's reliance on the 
representation of Auto Owner's agent was reasonable."). 
In deciding the issue before it, this Court could make several different decisions. 
As only some examples, this Court could decide: (1) that the written policy controls and 
alleged pre-purchase oral statements cannot expand coverage, the position argued by 
Auto Owners; or (2) that the written policy does not necessarily control if written 
representations are made by an actual agent of the insurer in the sense that the agent is an 
employee of the insurer, but not if she or he is an employee of an independent contracting 
sales agency; or (3) the same as (2), but with respect to oral representations; or (4) that 
the written policy does not necessarily control even if the insurance sales agent making 
alleged written representations, is an employee of an independent contractor sales agency 
as in the case at bar; or (5) the same as (4) but concerning oral representations; or (6) that 
the written policy controls unless there is actual fraud in the inducement. 
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Wherever the Court decides on such a continuum of potential decisions, or 
elsewhere, if this Court decides consistent with (1), (2) or (3) in the immediately 
preceding paragraph, then this case should not be remanded for trial, but the district 
court's summary judgment should be affirmed and the Court of Appeal's decision 
reversed. That is, if this Court decides that oral representations cannot expand the written 
coverage, or that only representations, either written or oral, of an actual agent/employee 
of an insurer, as opposed to an employee of an independent contracting sales agency, can 
be used to expand coverage, then this case should not be remanded for trial. The reason 
for that is because in the case at bar, the sales agent/agency making alleged 
representations was an agent of an independent contractor, Cottonwood Insurance. (Auto 
Owners Original Brief at pp. 3-4, paras. 6-13). Only if this Court determines that even 
oral representations of a sales agent as an agent of an independent contracting sales 
agency can be used to expand the written coverage provided by the actual insurer, should 
this case be remanded for trial, again because in the present case alleged oral 
representations were made by the independent contracting sales agency, Cottonwood 
Insurance (See Auto Owner's original brief at 3-5). 
Not only with respect to the actual agents involved in this case, but also with 
respect to Mr. Youngblood's general arguments, he appears to lump all "agents" together, 
whereas this Court may well make a distinction between employee agents and 
independent contractor sales agents. See for example, Youngblood's brief at Summary of 
Argument, pg. 4 (". . . where the scope of coverage is misstated by company agent. . ."); 
Argument, pg. 5 (". . . should be held to honor the oral representations of their agents . . 
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."); pg. 5 (". . . insurance companies may be estopped to deny the affirmative 
representations of their agents."); pg. 6 (". . . to hold insurers to the promise of their 
agents."); pg. 8 (". . . regardless of statements of their agents . . ."); pg. 9 (". . . pro-
coverage [sic] misrepresentations by sloppy and unscrupulous insurance company 
representatives, . . ."); pg. 9 (". . . the effect of oral representations of their agents . . ."); 
pg. 10, (quoting Harr ". . . where an insurer or its agent misrepresents . . ."); pg. 11, 
(quoting American Family ". . . when the insurer's agent makes oral representation . . ."); 
pg. 11, quoting American Family "The parties agreed that the agent had never mentioned 
the sprinkler . . ."); pg. 12 (quoting American Family ". . . the agent's oral representations 
at the time of sale can override the written terms . . ."); pg. 12 (" . . . including 
'reasonable reliance upon an agent's representation'" . . .); pg. 13 " . . . overzealous, 
careless, and or unscrupulous insurance company's sales people . . ."). 
Auto Owners emphasizes that under the law of this State, a party should only be 
liable for that party's own fault. (See Auto Owner's original brief Point II). Even if this 
Court should rule that the pre-purchase oral representations could expand coverage, a 
position Auto Owners strongly disagrees with, at least this Court should only allow oral 
representations of the insurer's own employee/agents to so expand coverage and not that 
of agents of an independent contracting sales agency. It would be inequitable and 
contrary to fault principles in Utah for the written policy language and actual coverage to 
be expanded by representations of an independent contracting sales agency such as 
Cottonwood Insurance in the case at bar. 
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POINT IV 
REASONABLE RELIANCE CAN BE A MATTER OF LAW. 
In the present case, Mr. Youngblood argues that reasonable reliance, usually a 
question for the jury, should a jury question in this case. However, reasonable reliance 
can be determined as a matter of law. This Court should hold that where representations 
are not made by the insurer itself, but by an independent insurance sales agency, and the 
later clear written policy of the actual insurer is produced to the insured, the insured 
should have an obligation to read the policy, and any reliance on representations of some 
independent sales agency under such circumstances should not be reasonable, as a matter 
of law. An insured should determine that what he or she desired, was agreed to by the 
insurer, especially when they are dealing through an independent intermediary. This 
Court should hold that an insured has an obligation to read a policy such as the one at 
issue which is clear as a matter of law.1 
POINT V 
SOME OF THE FACTS SET OUT BY MR. YOUNGBLOOD ARE 
NOT RELEVANT AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED 
In its Statement of Case, Mr. Youngblood states that he "communicated with Auto 
Owners regarding his attempt to settle the claim . . ." (Brief at 3, para. 7), and that Mr. 
Youngblood relied ". . . in settling his claim . . . on representation of Auto Owner's 
agents. . ."). The issue before the Court is alleged pre-policy representations, not alleged 
1
 Reliance on alleged statements of the independent representative is also unreasonable 
where Mr. Youngblood believes underinsured motorist coverage covers him when he is 
even sitting at this desk as he feels was mentioned to him in the same context as his 
walking down the street was mentioned. (Auto Owners' Original Brief at 4, para. 10.) 
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post-policy pre-settling representations, which are denied by Auto Owners, and which are 
not at issue. 
POINT VI 
ISSUES ON APPEAL SHOULD NOT BE DECIDED IN THE 
ABSTRACT WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE SPECIFIC 
FACTS IN THE CASE AND CONTROVERSY BEFORE IT. 
In his brief, Mr. Youngblood states that Auto Owner's has, "gone far a field from 
the issue . . . " and that there are "factual and legal contentions set forth in Auto Owner's 
Brief that are extraneous.". . . .Youngblood's brief at 1, n.l. Mr. Youngblood does not, 
however, state what factual and legal contentions are extraneous and far a field. 
Any issue to be decided by an appellant court, is decided in the context of the facts 
and circumstances of the specific case and controversy before the Court. Cases in the 
appellate courts are not decided in a vacuum or in the abstract. Courts do not issue 
advisory opinions. In attempting to guess what facts and issues Mr. Youngblood feels are 
extraneous, Auto Owner's asserts that it is not extraneous that plaintiff did not plead 
equitable estoppel resulting allegedly from representations of an agent of Auto Owner's 
prior to the purchase of the insurance at issue. See Auto Owner's Original Brief at Point I. 
CONCLUSION 
The Summary Judgment granted by the District Court should be affirmed and the 
Court of Appeal's decision reversed. In the unlikely event that the Court finds that 
estoppel can be used to expand clear written coverage of an insurance policy, this case 
should not be remanded for trial, unless this Court decides that alleged representations of 
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an independent contracting sales agency can estop a separate insurer from asserting the 
clear terms and limits of its insurance policy. 
>.fh DATED this Hj^ day of October 2005. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
ROBERT R. WALLACE 
Attorney for Defendant - Petitioner -Appellant 
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